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Abstract. In this paper the extended model of Minority game (MG), in-
corporating variable number of agents and therefore called Grand Canon-
ical, is used for prediction. We proved that the best MG-based predictor
is constituted by a tremendously degenerated system, when only one
agent is involved. The prediction is the most efficient if the agent is
equipped with all strategies from the Full Strategy Space. Each of these
filters is evaluated and, in each step, the best one is chosen. Despite the
casual simplicity of the method its usefulness is invaluable in many cases
including real problems. The significant power of the method lies in its
ability to fast adaptation if λ-GCMG modification is used. The success
rate of prediction is sensitive to the properly set memory length. We con-
sidered the feasibility of prediction for the Minority and Majority games.
These two games are driven by different dynamics when self-generated
time series are considered. Both dynamics tend to be the same when a
feedback effect is removed and an exogenous signal is applied.
Keywords: Minority Game as a predictor, Financial Markets, Grand
Canonical extension
1 Introduction
The minority decision is defined as a function of a self-generated signal called ag-
gregate attendance or aggregate demand [7,21]. In the standard Minority Game,
the sequence of minority decisions constitutes the basis for individuals’ actions.
Following an economics terminology, the series of minority decisions formed in-
side a model, is called endogenous. Hence, the MG mechanism is tantamount to
predicting a future value using past values of the same, endogenous, time series.
The mentioned feedback effect exists at the level of the population but not at the
level of single agent. That is, although individuals’ decisions directly influence
the aggregate demand, the agents themselves do not possess any mechanisms
to account their contributions to the aggregate variable. Hence, individuals are
unable to recognize whether the signal is self-generated or a fake one i.e. taken
from the outside of the model. In opposition to the term endogenous, the series
of fake histories is called exogenous if it affects a model, but is not affected by
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it. Hence, instead of showing to agents true i.e. self-generated histories one can
generate them randomly. Such game is commonly known in the literature as MG
with fake histories [11]. The genuine and modified MG is described in Sec. 2.
As presented in Ref. [4], the MG can be potentially used as the predictor of
any exogenous (fake) series, provided that dependencies in the signal reflect the
patterns built in strategies[17,13,14]. The details of the current state of the art
are presented further in section 3.
In section 4 we presented the model and its configuration. Then, in sec-
tion 5, we verified the quality of the predictor using the time series generated
by the well understood, autoregressive stochastic process. After analyzing our
numerical results, we provided a methodology for tuning the parameters. In-
triguingly, the best results are achieved if the game is degenerated to only one
single agent equipped with all strategies from the whole strategy space. This
new discovery seems to stay in contradiction to commonly used optimization
techniques [17,13,14], where authors try to find a set of parameters for which
the statistical properties of exogenous and predicted time series are mutually
close.
Additionally, in section 5 we presented some new insights which allow us to
improve the model. For example, it was proved that if the exogenous signal is
exploited, then there is no qualitative difference between minority and majority
game. We also introduced a modification, the so called λ-GCMG, that is well
suited for quasti-stationary signals. In all of experiments, where the autoregres-
sive process was involved, we compared the MG results with those achieved by
the best theoretical predictor found for the analyzed process.
Finally, in the section 5, the properly tuned MG model was applied as a fore-
caster of assets prices on financial markets. For some intraday data the achieved
success rate of one-step prediction is around 70% what significantly exceeds the
random case.
2 The Formal Definition of the Minority Game
At each time step t, the nth agent out of N (n = 1, . . . , N) takes an action
aαn(t) according to some strategy αn(t). The action aαn(t) takes either of two
values: −1 or +1. An aggregated demand is defined
A(t) =
N∑
n=1
aα′
n
(t), (1)
where α′n refers to the action according to the best strategy, as defined in eq. (3)
below. Such defined A(t) is the difference between numbers of agents who choose
the +1 and −1 actions. Agents do not know each other’s actions but A(t) is
known to all agents. The minority action a∗(t) is determined from A(t)
a∗(t) = −sgnA(t). (2)
Each agent’s memory is limited tommost recent winning, i.e. minority, decisions.
Each agent has the same number S ≥ 2 of devices, called strategies, used to
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predict the next minority action a∗(t + 1). The sth strategy of the nth agent,
αsn (s = 1, . . . , S), is a function mapping the sequence µ of the last m winning
decisions to this agent’s action aαs
n
. Since there is P = 2m possible realizations
of µ, there is 2P possible strategies. At the beginning of the game each agent
randomly draws S strategies, according to a given distribution function ρ(n) :
n→ ∆n, where ∆n is a set consisting of S strategies for the nth agent.
Each strategy αsn, belonging to any of sets ∆n, is given a real-valued function
Uαs
n
which quantifies the utility of the strategy: the more preferable strategy, the
higher utility it has. Strategies with higher utilities are more likely chosen by
agents.
There are various choice policies. In the popular greedy policy each agent
selects the strategy of the highest utility
α′n(t) = arg max
s:αs
n
∈∆n
Uαs
n
(t). (3)
If there are two or more strategies with the highest utility then one of them is
chosen randomly. Each strategy αsn is given the payoff depending on its action
aαs
n
Φαs
n
(t) = −aαs
n
(t) g[A(t)], (4)
where g is an odd payoff function, e.g. the steplike g(x) = sgn(x) [8], proportional
g(x) = x or scaled proportional g(x) = x/N . The learning process corresponds
to updating the utility for each strategy
Uαs
n
(t+ 1) = Uαs
n
(t) + Φαs
n
(t), (5)
such that every agent knows how good its strategies are.
The presented definition is related to genuine MG [7]. If game is used as the
predictor then the feedback effect is destroyed and µ is e.g. generated randomly.
3 Relation to other models
As it is know from other works [7,5,22] the standard MG exhibits an intriguing
phenomenological feature: a non-monotonic variation of the volatility when the
control parameter is varied. There are two mechanisms potentially responsible for
it: the feedback effect and the quenched disorder [7]. The incorporated feedback
effect couples input and output signals in such a way that a minority decision at
time t constitutes the basis for future agents’ decisions. The quenched disorder
is related to an initial, random realization of agents’ strategies in their strategy
space. In theoretical papers [4,6,19] it is discussed how the feedback mechanism
affects observed behavior of MGs. For us it is important that the lack of the
feedback does not influence the population’s predictive power which is exclusively
driven by the quenched disorder.
Some other authors applied the model to the exogenous, real data, assuming
an existence of patterns in these data and using MG as a predictor of its future
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value [17,15,13,14,10,18]. Although the MG-based predictor is able to forecast
any time series assuming that the length of patterns suits agents’ strategies, the
commonly used exogenous time series are those related to asset prices. The idea
of feeding the game with a real signal was first implemented by Johnson et al.
in Refs. [17,15]. The authors performed an experiment where the time series
of hourly Dollar $/Yen U exchange rate was examined. The achieved results
show the 54% success rate of the next movement prediction. This level is quite
significant and suggests that the model performs better than random. Although
the results presented in Ref. [17] are interesting and inspiring, there is nearly no
details about the conditions of the experiment. Such parameters like m, S, N
are not revealed, making the results unreproducible.
The prediction method used in Ref. [15] was further developed by oth-
ers [13,14,10], and applied to daily data of the Shanghai Index. The similar
model, where agents have various lengths of memory, was introduced in Ref. [18].
Above methods of optimization are based on comparison between two distribu-
tions of signals, i.e. the exogenous and predicted one. If the distributions are
mutually close to each other, the model is considered as a well fitted to the ob-
ject. As we presented in section 5, this technique, although interesting, does not
assure that the success rate of the one-step prediction is maximized.
4 The model
Here, we present the details about our implemented predictor and its configura-
tion. We used, the Grand Canonical extension of the MG in all our simulations.
4.1 Grand canonical extension
In the standard MG all agents have to play at each time step t, even if all of
their strategies are unprofitable. Looking for analogies to financial markets we
see that in real life investors behave differently. If for some of them trading is
not profitable, they withdraw from the market. Hence, at given time, two groups
of agents can be found on the real market: (i) active - actually engaged in the
game, (ii) passive - observing the game and waiting for the proper moment to
enter. Formally, staying apart from the market is realized by zero strategy. This
additional strategy, marked as α0
i
, maps all µ to the ai = 0 and does not influence
the aggregate demand A. We assume a constant risk-free interest rate as being
equal to Uα
0
i
(t) = Uα
0
i
= 0. During the game, each agent i monitors average
profits Uα
i
(t) of each of his/her strategies αi. If U
α
0
i
(t) is higher than the utility
of any other strategies, than the strategy α0 is used and the agent stays beyond
the market.
4.2 Configuration
Technically, the predictor works according to the diagram presented in Fig. 1.
The object that we suppose to model is treated as a black-box stimulated by (i)
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the vector of previously generated signs of samples sgn
(
−→y (t− 1)
)
= [sgn
(
y(t−
1)
)
. . . sgn
(
y(t − n)
)
], where n > 1, and (ii) the external information ξ(t). We
assume that samples of ξ are Independent and Identically Distributed (IID).
The model is supposed to retrieve dependencies between the past and future
values of sgn(y(t)). The delay block introduces a one-step delay to its every
)(t[ )(ty
))(sgn( ty
))1
(
sg
n
(

t
y
))(sgn( ty
)(t<
Fig. 1. Block scheme presents the MG in the configuration of prediction.
input sample y(t) and forms the vector y(t−n) of n > 1 past samples. The MG
model predicts the next sign of sample exploiting the information included in the
signs of previous movements. The block f compares the predicted signal with
a real output of the object and calculates the correctness Ψ(t). The correctness
Ψ(t) represents the average success rate of prediction and is calculated as a
percentage of properly predicted signs of y, provided that all samples up to time
t are considered:
Ψ(t) =
1
t
t∑
n=1
δ(sgn(y(n)), ̂sgn(y(n))) (6)
where δ stands for Kronecker symbol.
Two types of objects were analyzed: the autoregressive stochastic processes
and the time series of real prices of shares. The former is mainly used to demon-
strate interesting properties of the model and to learn how to tune its parameters.
The latter one is used as an example of practical application of the predictor.
In the case of the autoregressive stochastic process, assuming that the definition
of the object is known, the maximal theoretical level of Ψ can be calculated as
follows:
ΨMAX(t) =
1
t
t∑
n=1
δ(sgn(y(n)), sgn(E[y(n)])). (7)
The expected value E[y(n)] is calculated recursively for each n according to the
process definition.
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5 Optimization of the parameters
Initially, we apply the predictor to the third order autoregressive time series,
AR(3) defined as follows:
y(t) = 0.7y(t− 1)− 0.5y(t− 2)− 0.2y(t− 3) + ξ(t), (8)
where ξ(t) is an instance of the standardized gaussian white noise. It is easy
to check that the process is stable1. It was found numerically that the process
is characterized by E[ΨMAX ] = 0.77, and Var[ΨMAX ] < 0.01, where t = 3000
steps, and the average was taken over ten realizations.
5.1 Majority vs minority game
The model extensively used in literature is based on the grand canonical minor-
ity game [17,15,13,14,10]. However, it was not obvious for us if the minority
mechanism is better than the majority one. In fact we found that, in the case of
prediction, both mechanisms are equivalent.
The algorithm of the majority game is very similar to that of the standard
minority game. The only difference is a formula (4) which for majority game
reads
Φαs
n
(t) = aαs
n
(t) g[A(t)]. (9)
We consider two time series: the endogenous and exogenous. Considering first
the game with endogenous time series we find a number of differences between
the minority and majority game. In the minority game no one of strategies is
permanently profitable provided that the game is large enough [16,25]. Hence, the
number of winners and losers changes in time. On the contrary, in the majority
game the number of winners and losers is stable and, on average, N(1 − 1
2S
)
agents are in majority. The reasoning behind is similar to that presented in
Refs. [23,24] and utilizes our observation that the first large oscillation creates a
comprehensive difference in utilities of strategies. The strategies are divided into
two categories: the good with the positive payoff, and bad ones with negative.
In any time step t there is on average N(1− 1
2S
) agents with at least one good
strategy and only N/2S agents with all bad strategies. Since most of agents has
at least one good strategy - they use it. The difference, compared to the minority
game, is that those who are in majority are not interested in changing the choice
when they win. Similarly, the losers cannot change their situation because they
do not have even one good strategy. Given this, the division between these two
groups stays stable and the aggregate demand and utilities exhibit the one-
directional trend. It persists in contradiction to the minority game, where the
processes are mean-reverting. The above is true if the payoff is linear and the
feedback effect is incorporated, i.e. the series of decisions is endogenous. The
1 Taking the Z-transform, the transfer function H(z) can be calculated. Three poles of
H(z) are located within unit circle |z| < 1 what indicates that the analyzed system
is stable.
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reasoning is slightly modified when the step-like payoff is applied but also in this
case the essential differences between the minority and majority game remain.
Intriguingly, both games are equivalent, regardless of the payoff, when series
of decisions is exogenous. Originally, in the standard minority game, strategies
predicting sign opposite to y(t) are rewarded. Assuming that patterns in the
exogenous signal exist, the individuals prefer more often strategies predicting
sgn(y(t)) incorrectly i.e. most of them fail with prediction. The predictor aggre-
gates decisions of individuals and acts in opposition to the majority, and, predicts
correctly. Contrary to the minority game, in the majority game, strategies that
correctly forecast sgn(y(t)) are rewarded and most of agents follow strategies
more frequently recognizing patterns. Subsequently, the predictor acts accord-
ing to action suggesting the majority and also correctly recognizes patterns.
Given this, the majority and minority game should provide the same quality
of prediction. This is confirmed by numerical simulations presented in Fig. 2
(right). The experiment was performed using ten realizations of the AR(3) pro-
cess. The number of strategies per agent S was set to 2, the memory length m to
3 and the number of agents N was varied. Two curves show the success rate of
prediction related to the minority nad majority approaches. As it is seen, there
are no qualitative differences between them. Small distortions are due to random
choice of strategies at the beginning of all simulations.
5.2 Tuning of m, N and S parameters
Considering three parameters: m,N and S, at least m requires different opti-
mization techniques than two others. The optimization of m is strictly related
to analysis of time series properties, especially the analysis of the range of depen-
dencies between values of Y . Therefore it depends on the researcher’s knowledge
about the object. There are different methods of finding this range.
If the process is explicitly known, m is equal to the order of this process,
e.g. m = 3 for AR(3). The predictor with m lower than the order cannot work
effectively because strategies would incorrectly recognize patterns. Larger values
of m would introduce additional and unnecessary noise that would degrade the
prediction. The latter effect is further illustrated and explained in the section
6.2.
If the order is unknown but the type of the process is known (e.g. autoregres-
sive one) some techniques based on the autocorrelation analysis can be applied
to detect the order, as presented in Ref. [2].
The problem is most difficult if the order and the system are unknown, as it is
in many real cases (e.g. prices in financial markets). Still the correlation analysis
can suggest the number of past samples be used. In this section we assume that
the order of the examined AR process is explicitly given.
In order to find the proper technique for N and S optimization, let us assume
that a certain pool of strategies of constant size has to be optimally assigned to
agents. It means that, under the constraint NS = const, we are looking for the
proportion between number of agents N and number of strategies per agent S
that maximizes the correctness Ψ . We would also like to examine if the optimal
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Fig. 2. Left: Comparison of correctness Ψ for the minority and majority games for
S = 2 and variable N . Red dashed line corresponds to the minority game and green
solid line to the majority game. Right: Solid grey line corresponds to the theoretical
maximal value, green dotted line corresponds to MG for N = 1 and various S values,
blue dashed line corresponds to MG for S = 5 and various N values, red dash-dotted line
corresponds to MG for S = 2 and various N values. The ’x’ mark corresponds to MG
for N = 1 and S = 16 pairwise different strategies from the Reduced Strategy Space.The
star ’*’ corresponds to MG for N = 1 and S = 256 pairwise different strategies from
the Full Strategy Space. Error bars correspond to one standard deviation and curves
are drawn to guide ones eye.
proportion is sensitive to the constraint’s change. Our numerical studies are
presented in Fig. 2. The correctness is presented as a function of NS, as changing
the size of the strategies’ pool influences the results. Solid grey line corresponds
to the maximal value that is reached by the best possible predictor (in this case
linear filter). Blue dashed line corresponds to MG for S = 5 and variousN values,
red dash-dotted line corresponds to MG for S = 2 and various N values. These
two curves show that the more strategies per agent the better the correctness
Ψ , provided that the constraint NS = const is preserved. Following further this
reasoning, the most efficient is obtained for just one agent possessing given pool
of strategies. Indeed, this is confirmed by the green dotted line corresponding
to MG for N = 1 and various S values. As it is seen, the predictor with such
configuration outperforms any other predictor.
In order to reason out of the presented results, assume there are many agents
but only one of them has the best strategy. Even if this strategy suggests a
correct prediction for itself the prediction of the whole system can be potentially
incorrect, provided there is sufficiently many agents with bad strategies. Such
situation is less probable when the number of strategies per agent is increased
and concurrently the number of agents is decreased. This is impossible if there
is only one agent because then the best strategy is always used. Similarly, if
the constraint on NS is shifted towards larger values and number of agents
is preserved, then the probability, that more and more agents have a correct
strategy becomes large. Hence, in the limit NS →∞, all agents have the correct
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strategy and the efficiency of the group is the same as the efficiency of a single
agent equipped with the aggregated pool of strategies.
Considering Ψ as a function of the S value, the larger value of S, the better
results, as there is a larger probability that better strategy is drawn by an agent.
However, if S is above some threshold, the pool of strategies is oversampled
and many agent’s strategies are the same. Since there is no particular gain if
agent has more than one best strategy at his disposal, the success rate does not
increase. Given this, one can wonder if a random draw is the most efficient way
to generate strategies. Indeed it is not. Only the fully probed strategy space
assures that, if the best strategy exists, then it is used in the game, provided
N = 1. The fringe benefit is that there is also no redundancy between strategies,
what reduces the computational costs. Hence, the best MG predictor is based
on single agent equipped with all pairwise different strategies, i.e. all strategies
covering Full Strategy Space (FSS). However, in cases when m is large, it can
be hardly possible to generate so huge set of strategies. Therefore, for higher m
it seems reasonable to use all strategies from Reduced Strategy Space (RSS).
The RSS consists of only 2m+1 strategies which are pairwise uncorrelated or
anticorrelated, i.e. the normalized Hamming distance between them is equal
to 0.5 or 1 [9]. The RSS apparently reduces the complexity and still assures
good quality of prediction as FSS is regularly probed. These statements are
visualized in Fig. 2 where marks ’x’ and ’*’ represent results for single agent and
all strategies related to RSS (16 strategies) and FSS (256 strategies) respectively.
Despite of a numerous differences between both pools the results are close, which
indicates a superior power of RSS usage.
The presented above methodology differs significantly from approaches pre-
sented by other researchers [17,13,10]. In those papers the whole bunch of in-
dividuals is used and the strategy distribution is randomly initiated. Although
those methods work either, the approach presented here is optimal.
5.3 Nonstationary signals and λ-GCMG predictor
The agents’ behavior is determined by the strategies’ utilities which they have
at their disposal. Generally, the strategies that collect more frequently a posi-
tive payoff are characterized by a monotonously rising utilities. The utilities are
thus potentially unbounded, what carries some considerable consequences if the
exogenous process is a non-stationary one. Namely, if characteristics of a mod-
elled object changes at time t then the group of best strategies would change
either. But if, until t, some strategies collected many positive payoffs and after
time t they are no longer profitable, then many steps with negative payoffs are
required to lower their utilities. Hence, after time t the system still uses poten-
tially ineffective strategies. The following example should provide some deeper
understanding of this issue.
Let us assume that after 1500 steps the system described by Eq. 8 is replaced
by the following one: y(t) = −0.3y(t− 1)− 0.2y(t− 2) + 0.6y(t− 3) + ξ(t). The
new AR(3) process is defined in such a way that the best MG strategies for this
process constitute also the set of the worst strategies of the previous process.
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Trajectories of utilities of GCMG predictor are in Fig. 3. One can see that after
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Fig. 3. U(t) of all sixteenth pairwise different strategies from RSS for MG characterized
by N = 1 and m = 3. The first figure corresponds to a classical GCMG. The second
figure corresponds to the modified λ-GCMG with λ = 0.97.
time t = 1500 the predictor still uses strategy which is no longer efficient, but is
characterized by the highest U . As a result, the Ψ as a function of time starts
to decrease, as seen in Fig.4 (green dotted line).
In order to speed up the new appraisal of outdated U we modified the predic-
tor by introducing additional parameter λ to the rule (5) that now is as follows.
Uαn(t+ 1) = λUαn(t) + Φαn(t), (10)
where λ ∈ [0, 1]. If λ = 1 the strategies have an infinite memory of all previous
rewards, what corresponds to standard MG. If λ = 0, then there is no memory
effect and the best strategy is the one with the largest payoff in the previous
step. The intermediate values 0 < λ < 1 preserve increasing of U to infinity,
when the process is a stationary one, what considerably speeds up the time of
adaptation. The exemplified results for the GCMG with λ = 0.97 are presented
in Fig. 3 (right). All initial conditions are the same as for picture in the left. It is
seen that for t > 1500 the new best strategy achieves the largest U much faster
than the game without λ modification. The system is able to quickly adjust to
changes, and the success rate of prediction is significantly improved, as presented
in Fig. 4.
The cost of the introduction of the additional parameter is a need of its
optimization. The heuristic analysis of correctness as a function of λ is presented
in Fig. 5. The value λ = 0.97 assures the best results, although other values, that
are close to it, work effectively either.
Summing up, the λ-GCMG model effectively follows changes in the predicted
signal and significantly outperforms the GCMG for a non-stationary process.
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Fig. 4. The time evolution of Ψ(t) for
λ-GCMG with N = 1 and S = 16
pairwise different strategies from RSS.
Red dashed line corresponds to λ = 0.7,
solid blue line corresponds to λ = 0.97 ,
green dotted line corresponds to λ = 1.
Fig. 5. The Ψ(t) at time t = 3000 for
λ-GCMG with N = 1, S = 16 pair-
wise different strategies from RSS and
λ = 0.97. Error bars correspond to one
standard deviation and curves are drawn
to guide ones eye. Statistics are calcu-
lated over 10 realizations of nonstation-
ary AR(3) process.
6 Sign prediction of assets’ returns
In this section we present the assumed model of movements of share prices.
Given this we apply the λ-GCMG predictor to retrieve dependencies between
past and future samples of stocks prices taken from various markets.
6.1 Price movements model
We assume that, generally, the dynamics of returns is driven by two factors
where one is endogenous and another one exogenous. The model of return rate
is
r(t) = f [r(t− 1), . . . , r(t −m)] + ξ(t), (11)
where the first term reflects a dependence on previous returns and the second
term represents the influence of external events.
To be precise, because MG predicts only the sign and not a value of sample,
we have to assume even stronger:
sgn(r(t)) = f [sgn r(t − 1), . . . , sgn r(t −m)] + ξ(t). (12)
We assume that the exact form of function f is unknown and it can evolve over
time. In case of the model in Fig. 1, the returns r(t) correspond to signals y(t).
Considering the second term ξ(t), there are many various exogenous factors,
e.g. publication of the Gross Domestic Product, inflation, companies annual
balances, bankruptcies, etc. Investors react on them in various ways. Therefore,
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instead of considering reactions of individuals separately, we assume that signals
of ξ(t) are instances of IID process, with mean value equal to zero. This signal
aggregates reactions of all individuals on all news that appear at time t. Such an
approach significantly simplifies further analysis, sice we have to pay an attention
only to dependencies between past and future returns and not to such relations
between exogenous factors.
The assumption that exogenous perturbations to returns are IID variables
seems more reasonable in the case of intraday data than for the end-of-day
data. As mentioned in the paper [17], exogenous events are relatively infrequent
compared to the typical transaction rate in the markets. This suggests that the
majority in high-frequency data movements can be potentially self-generated,
while the lower frequencies are dominated by exogenous factors.
6.2 Application of λ-GCMG
We look for a λ-GCMG model being able to estimate function f in Eq. (12). Us-
ing our previous results, we set the following parameter values: N = 1, λ = 0.97
and the number of strategies covering the RSS. The m value should be chosen
from the range 1 − 10. This premise is given by the analysis of data from the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) presented in Refs. [1,20,12]. The precise choice
of m requires some additional analysis. If we take a look at Fig. 6, where the
λ-GCMG is applied as a predictor to FW20 time series i.e. futures contracts on
WIG20 index that is the index of the twenty largest companies on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange, then it is seen that better correctness is achieved for lower m
i.e. m = 1. This result, at least at first sight, seems to be counter-intuitive. The
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Fig. 6. The time evolution of Ψ(t) (left) and Ψ(t) calculated in sliding window of length
equal to 100 (right) for λ-GCMG with N = 1, λ = 0.97 and strategies from Reduced
Strategy Space. Red solid line corresponds to m = 1, dashed blue line corresponds to
m = 2 , green dashed-dotted line corresponds to m = 5 (left). The predicted signal is
FW20.
RSS of higher order includes all strategies of RSS of lower order and additionally
GCMG as a sign predictor 13
introduces the same number of extra strategies. For example, if m = 2 then 4 of
8 strategies recognize the same patterns as strategies for m = 1 and additional 4
strategies introduce new functionality. The explanation is that for higher m the
additional strategies, although do not capture properly dependencies, get from
time to time higher utility than the basic ones correctly recognizing shorter pat-
terns. This happens randomly, as sometimes samples are in order that is reflected
by some of additional strategies. However, the pattern does not truly exist. In the
next steps the forecast, based on one of additional strategies, is mostly wrong,
what lowers the correctness. In other words, too long memory spoils the pre-
dictor introducing noise of unwanted strategies. The more the memory length
m exceeds real order of the system, the lower the success rate of prediction.
The observed degradation of correctness for longer m indicates that there are no
long-range and complicated patterns in the signal or that their nature is more
subtle than MG strategies are able to capture. The first statement is supported
by observations of the autocorrelation of returns, where the only distinct value
is for τ = 1. Similar premise is also included in Ref. [18] where the author found
that strategies with shorter m are more preferred by individuals.
The success rate for m = 1, it is mostly above 0.6, and from time to time
even touches the level 0.8, if calculated in the sliding window. The mean value
of correctness is 0.7 (see Fig. 6 - left), what seems impressive, at the first sight.
However, we checked that the correctness of Finite Impulse Response (FIR)
Wiener filter [3] of the first order is equal to 0.68. The use of higher-order filters
does not improve the predictor and, at least in this case, the linear regression is
good enough to assure similar results.
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Fig. 7. The correctness Ψ as a function of the memory length m, for 5 companies with
the biggest impact on index WIG20 for two different years 2007 (left) and 2008 (right).
The next question is, whether the results achieved for FW20 are specific only
for this asset or they are more universal. We examined separately 5 stocks with
the biggest impact on FW20 index: PKNORLEN, PEKAO, KGHM, PKOBP,
TPSA, each of them contributing to the index at the level of 11− 14%. As seen
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in Fig. 6, the success rate decreases as a function ofm, regardless of the analyzed
year. So the results seem to be time and stock independent.
Another interesting issue is related to the analysis of the best strategy. The
question is, whether there is only one strategy permanently outperforming other
strategies or, maybe, different strategies lead at various moments? If there is only
one, it would mean that patterns do not change over the game or that they do in
a way the strategies are unable to capture. One permanently best strategy also
would mean that the extended adaptive version of algorithm is, at least in this
case, as good as an ordinary GCMG or even as good as a linear filter. Indeed,
in Fig. 8 (left) it is seen that one of the strategies permanently outperforms
others. Interestingly, this strategy represents the mean-reverting approach, i.e.
after history µ = 1 it suggests a = −1 and after µ = −1 it suggests a = 1.
Accordingly, the opposite strategy representing a trend-follower approach, is the
worst one. The results are consistent with autocorrelation analysis where for
τ = 1 the coefficient is negative. We checked that the results are general for all
five examined firms.
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Fig. 8. The time evolution of U(t) for all of 4 strategies for λ-GCMG with N = 1 and
λ = 0.97 for index FW20 (left) and Astrazenca company (right).
The results for Polish market cannot be easily generalized to the London
Stock Exchange market. For example, companies like Vodafone or Astrazeneca
are not characterized by only one strategy being permanently better than others
(cf. Fig. 8 - right). The more so, for Astrazeneca, the best results with the
correctness equal to 0.6 are achieved for m = 2. It is difficult to explain why
such fundamental differences between stock markets exist. One of the hypotheses
is that the Polish market is less mature than LSE and dependencies between
samples are stronger. Although the hypothesis partially explains the larger values
of autocorrelations for τ = 1 in Polish market, it does not explain the longer
ranges of the LSE autocorrelations. This remains an open question.
The above analysis also shows that it is difficult to build a profitable investing
system if one would capture patterns using only agents’ strategies. If a sign of a
next increment is known to the investor with encouraging probability, then the
investor has to put the order. But placing the order introduces a perturbation
to the forecast. If the order is executed, the system would move to the next
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time step and the transaction would be considered as entailing the positive or
negative increment. The investor would predict only its own transactions what,
of course, does not assure any profit. Given this, the prediction for at least two
steps is required.
7 Conclusion
We applied the minority game as a predictor of an exogenous process. Inter-
estingly, considering parameters’ optimization, we found that the degenerated
game with only single agent and all strategies from FSS is the most efficient
configuration. The reason behind is as follows. The FSS is accessible to every
agent and all agents can use all possible patterns. Since there is only one agent,
there is no decision noise from other, badly equipped agents. If using the FSS
is computationally impossible, then the RSS is recommended. Considering the
quality of prediction, minority and majority games are equivalent. Considering
non-stationary signals, the parameter λ is introduced in order to speed up the
model’s convergence. However, the additional parameter requires extra optimiza-
tion. This parameter is introduced on heuristic basis.
Applying the predictor to the intraday financial time series allows to effec-
tively perform for one step where the correctness reaches 70% of properly rec-
ognized signs. The best strategy in the case of Polish stocks is a mean-reverting
one. Only slightly worse predictions are attained by autoregressive systems. Un-
fortunately, these encouraging results are mostly useless, for building a profitable
investing system. We explained that successful acting requires statistically sig-
nificant forecasts for more than only one step forward. The values of autocor-
relation function for τ > 1 suggest that it is hard to achieve. Nevertheless, the
complexity of human and algorithmic actions reflecting price movements consist
surely of nonlinear dependencies not properly captured in the autocorrelation
analysis. Therefore, application of MG to the prediction of longer periods seems
to be worth to check. The more so, the idea of building a profitable investing
system requires, in most cases, not only the knowledge of the direction of the
price movement but also some information about the strength of it. Hence, the
additional statistical methods should be compounded with the MG-predictor in
order to invest effectively. We consider it as a next step in our research.
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